

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCT 16, 1973 (SALT TWO - 313)

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED BY  
MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY, OCT 16, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCT 16, 1973

TODAY WE SHALL SET FORTH A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS  
IN SUBSTANTIATION OF SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT  
AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS,  
TABLED ON OCT 9, 1973 ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET  
GOVERNMENT.

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS OF MAY 1972  
AND JUNE 1973 EXPLICITLY INDICATE THE MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES  
GUIDING THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN SOLVING  
THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT IS THESE  
THAT FORMED THE BASIS FOR DRAWING UP THE TEXT OF THE PREAMBLE  
OF THE AGREEMENT, DRAFTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED  
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PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WERE  
THE DISCUSSIONS HELD EARLIER AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN

MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973 NOTED THAT THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT WAS RECORDED THAT THE SIDES PROCEED FROM THE NECESSITY OF UNDERTAKING SPECIAL EFFORTS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE EFFORTS IS TO FIND SUCH SOLUTIONS AS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS EFFECTIVELY AND CREATE THE PREREQUISITES FOR THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION.

THE EFFORTS OF THE SIDES TOWARD LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE DICTATED BY THE DESIRE TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR AND REDUCE THE RISK OF ITS OUTBREAK. MOTIVATED BY RECOGNITION OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS GOAL, WHICH IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL MANKIND, THE SIDES HAVE IN RECENT YEARS UNDERTAKEN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT STEPS OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE.

IN MAY 1972 THEY SIGNED THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH, HAVING FOR THE FIRST TIME LIMITED THE MOST MODERN AND MOST FORMIDABLE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, HAVE PLAYED AND CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. ON JUNE 22, 1973 THEY SIGNED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT ADOPTION OF FURTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD CONSTITUTE A NEW MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

WE BELIEVE THAT THESE LOFTY OBJECTIVES GUIDING THE SIDES MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS  
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POINTS OUT THAT IN WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE SIDES WILL PROCEED FROM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF MAY 29, 1972 AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROVISIONS, CONTAINING A REFERENCE TO THE DOCUMENTS AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON THE BASIS OF WHICH AN AGREEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT, MUST ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE PREAMBLE IN APPROPRIATE WORDING.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS BOTH SIDES HAVE REPEATEDLY NOTED THAT THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC

ARMS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE SIDES WILL "PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL". THE SIGNING IN MAY 1972 OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS A STEP TOWARD FULFILLMENT OF THIS OBLIGATION AND, AS YOU KNOW, THE PREAMBLE OF EACH OF THESE DOCUMENTS CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE ALSO TO INCLUDE A SIMILAR REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

A REFERENCE TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WOULD INCREASE THE INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND WOULD POLITICALLY LINK THE AGREEMENT WITH ALREADY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH LIMIT NUCLEAR ARMS AND LEAD IN THE DIRECTION OF ACHIEVEMENT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.

THE PREAMBLE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS A PROVISION REGARDING THE INTENTION OF THE SIDES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES  
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FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAVING IN MIND THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THIS PROVISION CORRESPONDS TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH STATED THE INTENTION OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WE WELL AS OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS WHICH STATE THAT "THE USSR AND THE USA REGARD AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THEIR EFFORTS ACHIEVEMENT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT".

THUS THE PREAMBLE OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DRAFTED WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR THE INTENTIONS OF THE SIDES AS SET FORTH IN THE JOINT DOCUMENTS, FULLY REFLECTS THE MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE CONCLUDED.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS DEFINES THE TASK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AS FOLLOWS: TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES FOR

THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEREFORE IT IS EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF SUCH ARMS THAT MUST FORM THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT, ALONG WITH OTHER MEASURES AIMED AT ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.

THEREFORE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INCLUDES AN ARTICLE I WHICH SETS FORTH THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES UNDER THE AGREEMENT REFLECTING ITS BASIC CONTENT. WE WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT DURING DISCUSSION OF THE ABM TREATY THE SIDES CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE IN THE TEXT OF THE TREATY A SIMILAR PROVISION SETTING FORTH THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES.

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESSENCE OF THE MEASURES BEING WORKED OUT AS MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ENSUES FROM THE VERY NATURE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND FROM THOSE TASKS WHICH WERE DEFINED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF OUR COUNTRIES FROM THE VERY START AND WHICH, IN THE BASIC  
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PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, WERE SPECIFIED AS THEY APPLY TO THE CURRENT STAGE.

THE MEASURES AGREED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 WERE A MAJOR STEP CONTRIBUTING TO CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. THEY SET A LIMIT ON THE QUANTITATIVE BUILD-UP OF THESE ARMS, WHICH HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE DURING THE PRECEDING PERIOD.

THE MEASURES LIMITING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COVERED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MUST BE STRENGTHENED. AT THE SAME TIME THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS INTENDED TO BE MORE COMPLETE AND THEREFORE MUST PROVIDE FOR LONG-TERM OBLIGATIONS TO LIMIT ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF AN ACCOUNT FOR THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS TOTALITY AND IN THE LONG TERM. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE INTERESTS OF PRECISELY BOTH SIDES ARE SERVED BY THEIR ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

THE POLICY OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ADOPTING APPROPRIATE MEASURES PERMEATES THE ENTIRE SOVIET DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ALSO REPRESENT A RESPONSE IN POSITIVE FORM TO THE QUESTIONS POSED AT THE PRECEDING PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT WITH CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE POLICY OF LIMITING THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT WILL

INDEED BECOME A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AS RECORDED IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, SIGNED JUNE 21, 1973. IN STATING THAT THEY WERE CONVINCED OF THE TREMENDOUS AND MULTIFACTED IMPORTANCE OF THE MEASURES BEING WORKED OUT, THE SIDES PROCEEDED FROM THE UNDERSTANDING THAT FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN AN EXTRA-ORDINARILY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND PEACE THROUGHOUT THE  
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WORLD. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PRECEDING DECADES CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THIS IS THE ONLY CORRECT PATH TOWARD A LASTING AND DURABLE PEACE AND TOWARD STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST RELIABLY LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND PROVIDE FOR OTHER MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS. IT IS PRECISELY THIS THOUGHT WHICH COMPRISES THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE I OF THE SOVIET DRAFT. JOHNSON

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